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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jeffrey B. Melling was arrested a police officer's warrantless search of a 
lockbox uncovered drug paraphernalia inside. Following Mr. Melling's arrest, law 
enforcement found methamphetamine in his wallet. The State charged him with 
possession of a controlled substance. 
Mr. Melling filed a motion to suppress the evidence in the lockbox and all 
subsequent evidence seized as a result of his arrest The district court granted the 
motion, finding that Mr. Melling did not abandon his privacy interest in the lockbox even 
though he had denied ownership. Due to Mr. Melling's privacy interest in the lockbox, 
the district court determined Mr. Melling could challenge the warrantless search of the 
lockbox. The district court concluded that unlawful police conduct led to the search of 
the lockbox and thus, the evidence obtained from the lockbox and the subsequent 
arrest must be suppressed. The State appealed. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The facts leading up to the search of the lockbox and Mr. Melling's arrest were 
provided to the district court by stipulation: 
On July 13, 2014, Officer Harward responded to 24 Oak Street in 
Nampa, Idaho for the report of a fight. When Officer Harward arrived on 
scene, he observed two males arguing at the front of the residence 
standing in the grass. Officer Harward separated the males and spoke 
with Defendant Melling. Defendant identified himself verbally and stated 
that he and his girlfriend, later identified as Dawn C. Singleton had gotten 
into an argument earlier that day while they were at a park. Defendant 
further stated that he then got into an argument with his roommate, Brain 
Tait, over the fact that he and Singleton had been arguing. Defendant 
stated that Tait walked up behind him and punched him in the side of the 
head, leading to further fighting. 
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While Officer Harward was speaking with Defendant, Singleton 
came outside and threw a lockbox on the grass, stating it belonged to 
Defendant Defendant stated he had never seen the box before and had 
no idea who it belonged to; Officer Harward stated that Defendant began 
to get very nervous about the box and continued telling Officer Harward 
about the events of the day. Officer Harward then spoke with Singleton 
who stated the lockbox belonged to Defendant who brought it from 
California and that inside drug paraphernalia and a vape device were 
located inside the box. Singleton then showed Officer Harward where the 
box allegedly was previously located next to Defendant's wallet in the 
bedroom where Defendant and Singleton were staying. 
Officer Harward went back outside to speak with Defendant, who 
again told Officer Harward that nothing in the box was his. Officer Harward 
proceeded to open the lockbox because the passcode was properly set. 
Inside the lockbox, Officer Harward located a black scale, a pipe with 
white crystal substance and some matches, as well as two fake 
identification cards for Kristine Placentia and Mitchell Rob Douglas. Officer 
Harward asked Defendant again what was inside the box, and Defendant 
denied knowledge of the contents. Officer Harward then placed Defendant 
under arrest based on the testimony of Singleton; he placed Defendant 
into handcuffs and double checked them for tightness. As Officer Harward 
escorted Defendant to the patrol vehicle, he observed Defendant walking 
in a strange manner, keeping his legs tightly together and only bending at 
the [knees]. Officer Harward had Defendant separate his feet to search for 
weapons or other paraphernalia, and when doing so, a glass pipe fell out 
of Defendant's shorts and shattered on the ground. Defendant denied 
ownership and knowledge of the pipe. 
Officer Harward later NIK Kit U tested the shattered portion of the 
glass pipe that fell from Defendant's shorts; the portion tested presumptive 
positive for methamphetamine. Officer Harward then received a call from 
Officer T Arnold who transported Defendant to the Canyon County Jail 
and advised Officer Harward that he had located a bag of white crystal 
substance inside Defendant's wallet, which later tested presumptive 
positive for methamphetamine and weighted .07 grams TPW. 
(R., pp.51-53.) The following day, the State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging that 
Mr. Melling committed a felony for possession of a controlled substance, 
methamphetamine, in violation of Idaho Code§ 37-2732(c)(1). (R., pp.8-9.) 
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Mr. Melling waived a preliminary hearing, and the magistrate bound him over to 
court. (R., pp.13-14.) The State filed an Information charging Mr. Melling with 
possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.15-16.) 
Mr. Melling filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of 
the lockbox and his subsequent arrest. (R., pp.21, 23-24, 26-31.) The State responded 
in opposition. (R., pp.33-38.) The district court held a hearing on the motion. (R., pp.39-
41.) Neither party presented any evidence at the hearing except the stipulated facts 
provided above. (R., pp.39-40.) The district court took the matter under advisement. 
(R., p.41.) 
According to the court minutes from a pre-trial conference, the district court orally 
announced its findings of fact and conclusions of law and granted the motion .1 
(R., p.46.) The district court subsequently issued a written Order Granting Motion to 
Suppress. (R., pp.51-59.) The State timely appealed. (R., pp.66-68.) 




State frames the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err by granting Melling's motion to suppress after 
concluding that because Melling denied owning a lockbox in an apparent 
effort to avoid criminal liability for contraband contained within the lockbox, 
such abandonment did not divest him of his privacy interest related to that 
property? 
Mr. Melling rephrases the issue as: 
Did the district court properly determine based on substantial and 




The District Court Properly Determined Based On Substantial And Competent Evidence 
That Mr. Melling Had A Reasonable Expectation Of Privacy In The Lockbox 
A Introduction 
On appeal, the State argues that the district court erred by finding that 
Mr. Melling did not abandon his privacy interest in the lockbox. The district court did not 
err, however. The district court had substantial and competent evidence to find that, 
despite his denial of ownership, Mr. Melling had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the lockbox based on the totality of the circumstances. Therefore, Mr. Melling requests 
that the Court affirm the district court's order granting his motion to suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court's order on a 
motion to suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also State v. 
Hunter, 156 Idaho 568, 570 (Ct. App. 2014) (same). 'The Court accepts the trial court's 
findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence." State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234 
(2005). The Court "has defined 'substantial evidence as such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion; it is more than a scintilla, but 
less than a preponderance."' Id. (quoting Evans v. Hara's, Inc., 123 Idaho 473, 478 
(1993)). "At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, 
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences is vested in the 
trial court." Hunter, 156 Idaho at 570. The Court exercises free review of "the trial court's 
application of constitutional principles to the facts found." Danney, 153 Idaho at 408. 
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C. The District Court Had Substantial And Competent To Find That Mr. Melling's 
Conduct Did Not Demonstrate Abandonment 
Fourth Amendment of the States Constitution protects citizens from 
unreasonable search and seizure." State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003). "Article 
I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution nearly identically guarantees that '[t]he right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated."' State v. Green, 158 Idaho 
884, 886 (2015) (alteration in original). Under both the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions, "[w]arrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable . . 
unless they come within one of the established exceptions to the warrant requirement." 
Id. at 886-87 (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991 ); State v. 
Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 295 (1988)). The State has the burden to show an 
exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Pruss, 145 Idaho 623, 628 (2008). 
A threshold issue to challenge an unlawful search is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. "A person challenging a search has the burden of showing that he or she had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the item or place searched." Id. at 626. Generally, 
the determination of a reasonable expectation of privacy involves a two-part inquiry: 
"(1) Did the person have a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the 
challenged search? and (2) Is society willing to recognize that expectation as 
reasonable?" Id. 
Abandonment of the item or place precludes an individual from claiming a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the property. "One who voluntarily abandons 
property prior to the search cannot be said to possess the requisite privacy interest." 
State v. Harwood, 133 Idaho 50, 52 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing Abel v. United States, 362 
6 
U.S. 217, 241 (1960)). "Abandonment, in the Fourth Amendment context, occurs 
through words, acts, and other objective facts indicating that the defendant voluntarily 
discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in his property." Id. (citing 
United States v. Ramos, 12 F.3d 1019, 1023 (11th Cir. 1994); Bond v, United States, 77 
F.3d 1009, 1013 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. McDonald, 100 F.3d 1320 (7th Cir. 
1996)).2 
In this case, the only issue raised by the State on appeal is whether the district 
court erred by finding that Mr. Melling did not abandon the lockbox. The State puts forth 
no other arguments on appeal to justify the warrantless search of the lockbox. As it was 
the State's burden to raise these issues on appeal, any other justification for the 
warrantless search is waived. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996). 
Despite the disclaimer of ownership, the district court properly found based on 
the totality of circumstances that Mr. Melling did not abandon his privacy interest in the 
lockbox. The stipulated facts provide three statements by Mr. Melling regarding the 
lockbox: (1) "he had never seen the box before;" (2) "he had no idea who it belonged 
2 Although there is no Idaho case law on point, many courts place the burden on the 
State to establish the defendant abandoned the item or place. See United States v. 
Fernandez, 772 F.2d 495, 449-500 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. Mendia, 731 
F.2d 1412, 1414 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Freire, 710 F.2d 1515, 1519 (11th Cir. 
1983); United States v. Alden, 576 F.2d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. 
Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Robinson, 430 F.2d 1141, 
1143 (6th Cir. 1970)). See also United States v. Pitts, 332 F.3d 449,456 (7th Cir. 2003); 
United States v. Cofield, 272 F.3d 1303, 1306 (11th Cir. 2001 ); State v. Carvajal, 996 
A.2d 1029, 1034 (N.J. 2010); State v. Rynhart, 125 P.3d 938, 943 (Utah 2005); State v. 
Reynolds, 27 P.3d 200, 205 (Wash. 2001) (en bane); State v. Cook, 34 P.3d 156, 160 
(Or. 2001); State v. May, 608 A.2d 772, 774 (Me. 1992); Watts v. Commonwealth, 700 
S.E. 2d 480, 485 (Va. Ct. App. 201 O); State v. Dennis, 914 N.E. 2d 1071, 1079 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2009); Powell v. State, 776 A.2d 700, 709 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001 ); State v. 
Clark, 727 P.2d 949, 952 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); People v. Rooney, 221 Cal. Rptr. 49, 55 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1985). But see People v. Taylor, 655 N.W.2d 399, 406 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2002) (burden on defendant). 
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to;" and (3) "nothing in the box was his" (R., p.52.) Mr. Melling's statements, however, 
are only one of the factors to be considered by the district court in making a 
determination of abandonment. See Harwood, 133 Idaho at 52. Other factors, such as 
Mr. Melling's "acts and other objective facts" at the time of the search, do not indicate 
that Mr. Melling abandoned his interest in the lockbox. Id. 
The district court found that Mr. Melling "was noticeably upset by the 
circumstances that led to Officer Harward's arrival." (R., p.58.) He "began to get very 
nervous about the box." (R., p.52.) The district court also found that Mr. Melling's 
girlfriend "was visibly angry" with Mr. Melling. (R., p.58.) And, contrary to Mr. Melling's 
disclaimer of ownership, Mr. Melling's girlfriend told Officer Harward twice that the 
lockbox belonged to Mr. Melling. (R., p.52.) She even showed Officer Harward the 
location of the lockbox in Mr. Melling's bedroom, right next to Mr. Melling's wallet. 
(R., p.52.) The district court further found that Officer Harward not only had "reasonable 
indicia" that the lockbox belonged to Mr. Melling, but also believed Mr. Melling actually 
owned the lockbox, evidenced by his arrest. (R., p.58.) After "significant consideration to 
the facts at hand," the district court determined that Mr. Melling's "conduct did not 
significantly constitute abandonment as is required by the Fourth Amendment to allow 
for a warrantless search." (R., p.58.) Based on its factual findings, the district court had 
substantial and competent evidence to find that Mr. Melling did not voluntarily abandon 
his privacy interest in the lockbox. 
The unusual facts of this case provide important context for the district court's 
findings on Mr. Melling's disclaimer of ownership. The intent to abandon "may be 
inferred from words spoken, acts done, and other objective facts, and all the relevant 
8 
circumstances at the time of the alleged abandonment should be considered." State v. 
150 P.3d 105, 109 (Wash. 2007) (en bane). As the trier of fact on a motion to 
suppress, the district court is vested with the discretion to weigh evidence, resolve 
conflicts, and draw factual inferences. Hunter, 156 Idaho at 570. Unlike most 
abandonment cases, 3 Mr. Melling did not initially have the lockbox in his physical 
possession and then discard it upon Officer Harward's arrival at the residence. Instead, 
Mr. Melling's girlfriend took the lockbox out of Mr. Melling's bedroom without his 
permission, threw it on the front lawn, and stated that it belonged to Mr. Melling. 
(R., p.52.) The girlfriend then alleged that the lockbox contained drug paraphernalia. 
(R., p.52.) It was in this context that Mr. Melling denied ownership. Even though he 
denied ownership, the district found that Mr. Melling did not abandon his privacy 
interest. (R., p.58.) As the finder of fact, the district court properly exercised its 
discretion to determine whether Mr. Melling's disclaimer of ownership was an 
abandonment "through the words, acts, and other objective facts" at the time of the 
warrantless search. Harwood, 133 Idaho at 52. Likewise, the district court had the 
discretion to give Mr. Melling's statements little to no weight in comparison to the other 
objective evidence of Mr. Melling's expectation of privacy in the lockbox. The State has 
failed to show error in the district court's factual findings on Mr. Melling's statements and 
its ultimate finding of no abandonment. 
3 'The great majority of the court decisions having to do with the abandonment of effects 
in a search and seizure context are similar ... in that it appears the defendant tried to 
dispose of certain incriminating objects upon the lawful approach of or pursuit by the 
police." 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 2.6(b) (5th ed.), Westlaw (database 
updated October 2014). 
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Moreover, State v. Zaitseva, 135 Idaho 11 (2000), does not provide a bright-Ii ne 
for abandonment In Zaitseva, the Court held that a search of a container in a 
vehicle was lawful because the police officer obtained consent to search the vehicle 
from: (1) the driver of the vehicle; (2) the defendant, a passenger in the vehicle; and (3) 
the absentee apparent owner of the vehicle. 135 Idaho at 13. The Court then held that 
the search was proper because the police officer had consent Id During its discussion 
of consent, the Court noted, "Furthermore, by denying ownership of the bag in response 
to the officer's inquiry prior to the search, [the defendant] essentially relinquished or 
abandoned any privacy interest in the contents of the bag." Id (citing Harwood, 133 
Idaho 50). Although the Court noted this alternative, supplemental means to uphold the 
search, the focus of the Court's discussion was on consent 4 Id In other words, the 
defendant's abandonment of the bag was not the essential or primary reason to uphold 
the search of the container. Zaitseva therefore does not stand for a bright-line rule that a 
disclaimer of ownership equals abandonment under any and all circumstances. 
Further, any rule from Zaitseva is not binding on this case because abandonment 
is a fact-specific inquiry. See United States v. Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561, 1576 (10th Cir. 
1991) ("the inquiry as to whether a defendant voluntarily abandoned property is 
particularly fact-based"); United States v Levasseur, 816 F.2d 37, 44 (2d Cir. 1987) 
("Abandonment is a question of fact, to be decided in objective terms on the basis of all 
the relevant facts and circumstances."); United States v. Morales, 737 F.2d 761, 763 
(8th Cir. 1984) (abandonment is a question of fact). The facts of Zaitseva and the case 
4 That the defendant abandoned the bag was raised only by the State in a footnote in its 
brief. Brief of Respondent at p.11 n.3, State v. Zaitseva, 135 Idaho 11 (2000) (No. 
24986), 1999 WL 33913713 ("The state submits that Zaitseva abandoned any privacy 
interest in the bag when she denied that interest to the officer."). 
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at bar have significant distinctions. In Zaitseva, a police officer searched a container in a 
vehicle, in which an individual has a diminished expectation of privacy. California v. 
471 U.S. 386, 391-92 (1985); State v. Gosch, 157 Idaho 803, 808 (Ct. App. 
2014). Here, Officer Harward searched a lockbox on the front lawn of Mr. Melling's 
residence, in which an individual has a greater expectation of privacy. State v. Webb, 
130 Idaho 462, 465 (1997); State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 523 (1986); State v. 
McBaine, 144 Idaho 130, 133 (Ct. App. 2007). In Zaitseva, both the driver of the vehicle 
and the defendant denied ownership of the bag, so there was some doubt as to 
ownership, especially in light of the absentee owner of the vehicle. Here, there is no 
evidence that more than one individual denied ownership of the lockbox. Instead, there 
was "reasonable indicia" showing that Mr. Melling owned the lockbox, and 
Officer Harward in fact believed that Mr. Melling owned it. (R., p.58.) In light of these 
factual differences between Zaitseva and the case at hand, Zaitseva does not provide a 
bright-line rule in this case that a disclaimer of ownership equates to an abandonment. 
Consistent with the district court's decision in this case, a denial of ownership is 
not a per se abandonment of the property. Although "(a] number of courts have held that 
an abandonment may arise out of a disclaimer of ownership made in response to police 
questioning," "it should not be assumed ... that a disclaimer of ownership always 
constitutes an abandonment for Fourth Amendment purposes." 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
SEARCH & SEIZURE § 2.6(b) (5th ed.), Westlaw (database updated October 2014). For 
example, a defendant's disclaimer of ownership of items that he pulled out of dumpster 
did not establish abandonment in light of the other facts of the case. State v. Cook, 34 
P.3d 156, 160-61 (Or. 2001 ). Similarly, a defendant's initial disclaimer of ownership of a 
11 
purse did not show abandonment when the defendant's subsequent conduct "strongly 
indicated" the defendant's privacy interest in the item. United States v. Burnette, 698 
1038, 1048 (9th Cir. 1983). Likewise, after the Washington Supreme Court 
surveyed the case law, it joined the prevailing view "that disclaiming ownership is not 
sufficient, by itself, to constitute abandonment" Evans, 150 P.3d at 111; see also id. at 
110-11 (discussing similar case law in various jurisdictions). Hence, ··[a]bandonment is 
different than a disclaimer of ownership made to the police prior to the search, which 
should not (but sometimes is held to) defeat standing." 6 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 
11.3(e). What is more, "a 'mere denial of ownership' cannot constitute abandonment 
when 'the police are on notice that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
property based on something other than ownership."' Id. (quoting United States v. Scott, 
987 A2d 1180, 1190 (D.C. 2010)). Here, the district court found that Officer Harward 
had more than mere "notice" of Mr. Melling's reasonable expectation of privacy. The 
district court found that Officer Harward in fact believed that the lockbox belonged to 
Mr. Melling based on the totality of the circumstances, such as the girlfriend's 
statements. (R., p.58.) Thus, in accordance with the authority on this issue, the district 
court properly reasoned that Mr. Melling's disclaimer, standing alone, did not show his 
abandonment of a privacy interest in the lockbox. See Evans, 150 P. 3d at 107-08, 111 
(holding defendant's denial of ownership of briefcase, found in defendant's truck in his 
garage, insufficient to establish abandonment). 5 
5 LaFave also recognized that in certain cases a disclaimer "plus a bit more" may 
establish abandonment. 6 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 11.3(f). Here, however, the 
State has not identified any additional evidence besides the disclaimer to show 
abandonment. Nor was any additional evidence presented to the district court. Although 
12 
Along the same lines, the district court was correct in relying on State v. Isom, 
641 P.2d 417 (Mont 1982), for its finding that Mr. Melling's disclaimer was intended to 
avoid incrimination, not abandon his privacy interest in the lockbox. "[A] mere disclaimer 
of ownership in an effort to avoid making an incriminating statement in response to 
police questioning should not alone be deemed to constitute abandonment." 6 LAFAVE, 
SEARCH & SEIZURE § 11.3(f). The Montana Supreme Court adopted this rule in Isom. 
641 P.2d at 422. The Montana Supreme Court explained: 
Given the position that a defendant does not otherwise have to incriminate 
himself to preserve his Fourth Amendment rights, as in Simmons v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 377 (1986), it is difficult to understand how a refusal to 
make incriminating admissions in response to police interrogation can be 
held to deprive a person of Fourth Amendment standing. 
Id. In light of the totality of circumstances showing a "custodial interrogation," the court 
in Isom held that the defendant's disclaimer of ownership of a car did not amount to an 
abandonment of his privacy interest in the item. Id. 
The State argues here that Mr. Melling was not in custody at the time of his 
disclaimer of ownership so "the custodial interrogation rationale from Isom is 
inapplicable." (Appellant's Br. at 7.) But the principle applied in Isom does not require 
that the defendant be subject to a "custodial interrogation" when he makes a disclaimer 
to avoid incrimination. In State v. Johnson, 940 A.2d 1185 (N.J. 2008), there was no 
claim that the defendant was subject to a custodial interrogation when he denied 
ownership of a duffel bag to avoid incrimination. Id. at 1197-98. In that case, the 
defendant was asked by a police officer to leave an apartment, and the defendant took 
a duffel bag (containing a firearm) with him on his way out. Id. at 1197. As the defendant 
Mr. Melling disclaimed ownership, all other evidence indicated his reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the item. 
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was walking out of the apartment, the police officer asked the defendant if the duffel bag 
was Id. The defendant at first "mumbled 'yes,"' but then denied ownership. Id. at 
1190, 1197-98. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held, "[W]e cannot conclude that 
defendant should be stripped of standing because he disclaimed ownership of the duffel 
bag in response to police questioning." Id. at 1198. The court reasoned: 
Assuming that he knew the contents of the bag, if we follow the way 
suggested by the State, defendant would be presented with a Catch-22: 
either he could admit that the duffel bag was his and incriminate himself, 
in which case his oral admission and the gun, if lawfully obtained pursuant 
to a search warrant, would be used against him at trial, or he could deny 
ownership of the bag, in which case he would not have standing to 
challenge an unlawful search. Those are hardly the circumstances that 
would allow for a voluntary disclaimer of a possessory interest in the bag 
for standing purposes. 
Id. In short, the court explained, "a defendant should not have to sacrifice his right 
against self-incrimination to assert his constitutional right to be free from an unlawful 
search." Id. The Johnson Court characterized the defendant's disclaimer as involuntary, 
but not because the defendant was subject to a "custodial interrogation." Rather, the 
court focused on whether the defendant intended to voluntarily abandon his privacy 
interest in the item or place based on his statements and other relevant facts. 
As illustrated by the case law, a disclaimer of ownership to avoid incrimination, 
standing alone, does not demonstrate abandonment because the intent of the 
disclaimer is not to voluntarily relinquish a privacy interest. The intent is to avoid arrest 
and criminal prosecution. At the same time, however, a disclaimer to avoid incrimination 
should not create an automatic exception to abandonment in every case: whether a 
disclaimer of ownership to avoid incrimination shows an intent to abandon depends on 
the specific facts of the case. Under the circumstances here, the district court had the 
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discretion to find that Mr. Melling's disclaimer was not intended as a voluntarily 
relinquishment of his privacy interest in the lockbox. After Mr. Melling's girlfriend told 
Harward that the lockbox belonged to Mr. Melling and had drug paraphernalia 
inside, Mr. Melling could either admit ownership (and incriminate himself) or deny 
ownership (and potentially lose "standing" to challenge an unlawful search). By denying 
ownership, the district court reasoned that Mr. Melling's intent was not to give up his 
privacy interests, but rather to deny "involvement in felonious activity" and 
"incrimination" in response to the girlfriend's allegations (R., p.58.) The district court 
properly determined based on the totality of circumstances that Mr. Melling's disclaimer 
of ownership to avoid incrimination, in and of itself, did not establish a voluntary intent to 
abandon his privacy interest in the lockbox. 
In summary, the district court had substantial and competent evidence to find that 
Mr. Melling did not voluntarily abandon his privacy interest in the lockbox. Without a 
warrant for the search of the lockbox, the discovery of evidence in the lockbox was "the 
result of unlawful police conduct," which the State does not challenge on appeal. 
(R., p.59.) In light of the unlawful search, the district court suppressed the evidence 
found in the lockbox and all subsequent evidence resulting from Mr. Melling's arrest. 
(R., p.59.) The State does not raise any issue with respect to these rulings, other than 
abandonment, and therefore Mr. Melling respectfully requests that the district court's 
order be affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Melling respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
granting his motion to suppress. 
DATED this 13th day of October, 2015. 
J 
De yty State Appellate Public Defender 
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